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It has be'eri'argued that the deficit activity of the United States Federal Government -- spend-
ing in excess of its revenues -- hinders the private sector because it "crowds out" potential 
borrowers in the private sector. The objectives of this paper are to examine that hypothesis and 
survey some of the literature focusing on the crowding out problem. Background information on 
government deficits and debt is included, along with supporting U.S. macroeconomic data from 
1940 through 1994. Other theorized downfalls of government deficits in addition to crowding out 
are presented, and a collection of empirical papers which attempt to either build or refute a link 
between deficits and higher interest rates is surveyed. Finally, two articles which look at the 
crowding out problem from very unique perspectives are presented. 
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THE MAKING OF A DEFICIT 
A deficit1 occurs when an individual spends beyond his or her level of income. The same is 
true for the U.S. government. It also experiences a deficit when its outlays are greater than its 
revenues. If receipts are in excess of total expenses, a budget surplus will result, but deficits 
have apparently proven more popular over the years. The federal government has experienced 
a surplus only eight times since 1940, with the last surplus occurring in 1969. In the 55 fiscal 
years from 1940 through 1994, the U.S. has ended its fiscal year with a deficit 85 percent of the 
time (Appendix A). 
The government's primary means of receipts are taxes from individuals and corporations. 
Individual income taxes comprise the single biggest portion of receipts. Income taxes accounted 
for 44.2 percent of total revenues in 1993. Outlays are numerous, but spending on national 
defense had traditionally been the largest single item on the expense list. However, in 1993, 
social security expenses, representing 21.6 percent of the federal government's outlays, over-
took defense expenditures as the single largest expense on the budget. Social security ex-
penses are forecasted to continue increasing in the future, while defense expenditures are ex-
pected to decrease each year (Office of the President 1994). 
When the government decides to spend beyond its means, it must do what any private house-
hold would do when purchasing a large item. The government enters the loanable funds market 
to secure a loan for more operating capital, much like a private household would enter the 
loanable funds market to purchase a house. The loans private households obtain are usually 
bank loans, in which a certain amount of principle is obtained at once and then repaid over a 
1. Deficit and debt are often used interchangeably, but the terms describe two different measurements. A 
_ deficit is the amount govemment spends in excess of its receipts in one fiscal period. Debt is the total 
amount of borrowed dollars that still must be paid off. Debt is a liability to the govemment which represents 
lenders' claims on the government's assets. While a deficit covers only one fiscal period, debt is the 
accumulation of deficits and surpluses from every fiscal period. 
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number of years. Loans which the government takes out have a variety of forms. U.S. Treasury 
bills, for example, are short-term (3-12 mos.) promissory notes sold to private savers. When an 
individual purchases a T-bill, the funds are given to the government to use. Once the T-bill 
expires, the government must pay back the amount of principle plus interest, which compen-
sates the saver for the use of his or her money. 
Other debt instruments of the federal government include Treasury notes and Treasury bonds, 
both of which tie up savers' money longer than the T-bill. T-notes mature from three to five 
years, while T-bonds have a lifetime of 10 to 30 years, depending on the particular bond pur-
chased. Because T-notes and T-bonds tie up money for a longer period of time, they have a 
higher interest rate to convince savers to give up the use of their money for a longer period of 
time. 
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AN EXPLANATION OF THE DATA COLLECTED 
All annual surplus and deficit data, debt, interest payments, gross domestic product (GOP) 
and GOP deflators were collected from Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Govern-
ment, printed by the Office of the President for fiscal year2 1996. Data on current dollar yearly 
deficits are listed from 1940 through 1994, the last year for which official numbers were avail-
able. All 1995 data are estimates taken from Historical Tables. All numbers were then indexed 
using a GOP deflator system, which is included in Historical Tables and is listed in Appendix O. 
The deflator uses 1987 as the base year. 
Appendices A, B, C and 0 are located at the end of this paper. Appendix A lists nominal and 
real federal receipts, outlays and the resulting deficits or surpluses. Appendix B illustrates real 
federal debt at the end of each fiscal year, along with per-capita deficit and per-capita debt. 
Appendix C lists real deficit and real debt as percentages of real GOP. 
All per-capita amounts were calculated using a spreadsheet and end-of-year U.S. population 
figures given in Historical Tables and publications of the U.S. Census Bureau. All per-capita 
amounts have been figured using real dollars rather than current dollars. All calculations, in-
cluding per-capita figures, and all graphs have been made using real amounts. No calculations 
have been made using the nominal columns -- they are listed for completeness only. 
Prior to 1977, the U.S. operated on a fiscal year beginning July 1 and ending the following June 30 
before an adjustment in 1976. It now begins Oct. 1 of each year and ends the following Sept. 30. In order 
to make the shift, the three months from July 1, 1976, to Sept. 30, 1976, comprise their own fiscal period 
and is denoted as the transitional quarter (TO). For Simplicity in this study, it was ignored when constructing 
the graphs, since the transitional quarter covers only three months of government activity. However, it is 
listed in the data tables. 
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ANALYZING THE DATA 
Real GOP has been steadily increasing since 1947 (Figure 1). It is incomplete, however, just 
to focus on the direction of GOP. Translating annual deficits into percentages of annual real 
GOP gives deficit amounts additional meaning (Figure 2). The more wealth a country has, the 
higher deficit it should be able to handle. This also holds for individuals. We would expect a 
wealthy businessperson to be able to undertake much more debt, such as a $3 million mortgage, 
with little concern rather than a high school student who earns minimum wage and works only 10 
hours a week. America's real deficit in 1994 of $161 billion is an ominous amount at first glance, 
but when one realizes it was less than four percent of real GOP in 1994, the deficit seems quite 
manageable. Real debt at the end of 1994 totalled $3.7 trillion dollars. This is debt that has 
accumulated for several years, but it represents only 70 percent of real GOP for fiscal year 1994 
alone. Households often borrow several times their annual income to purchase a home, but the 
u.s. will see more real aggregate income this year alone than the amount of debt it has stock-
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This is not to say that deficits and debt have no consequences on the welfare of a country. 
Operating a country's finances with a deficit is a cost of raising GOP, but if GOP raises substan-
tially, the benefits will outweigh that cost. Since 1947, annual deficits as percentages of GOP 
have been fluctuating between zero and seven percent, but the graph shows a gradual increas-
ing trend since the 1960s. 
Annual real debt as a percentage of annual real GOP had been decreasing substantially from 
the World War" years until the late 1970s, when the trend bottomed out (Figure 3). Currently, 
the percentage has been steadily increasing since that time. Thus, even though real GOP has 
been increasing steadily, end-of-year debt as a percentage of GOP has been increasing annu-
ally since 1981 as well. This is not to infer that real GOP would not have increased without the 
additional debt -- this is simply the trend at this time. 
While deficits and their resulting debt seem to be eating up larger percentages of GOP, per-
capita annual real deficits have been decreasing since 1992. The highest per-capita real deficit 
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since 1962 was $1 ,014, which occurred in 1983. Per-capita real deficit totalled $936 in 1992 but 
has since decreased to an amount of $616 in 1994. Per-capita real debt, meanwhile, has in-
creased each year since 1982 and amounted to $14,091 last year. 
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-ARE DEFICITS BAD? 
• Distinguishing Between Private and Public Debt 
When determining the usefulness and harmful effects of deficits, most people seem to ap-
proach government borrowing the same way they think about their own liabilities; the idea that 
"all debt is bad" generally prevails. Most would agree that the popular press has spent many 
words agonizing over the national debt. A number of attitudes about deficit spending, both 
positive and negative, stem from news stories and opinion columns. The first two items in this 
section detail common misperceptions about the harmful effects of government deficits. The last 
two items deal more with true economic inquiry and describe two viewpoints -- one that says 
deficit finance is harmful and the other holds that it is harmless. The negative viewpoint is a 
description of crowding out. The other viewpoint, a much more neutral paradigm, is a presenta-
tion of the Ricardo Equivalence Theorem -- the idea that each generation leaves behind wealth 
for future generations in order to "pay for" the debt it accumulated as a nation. 
• Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy occurs when a debtor, whether a business or a family, cannot pay its bills and 
creditors want their payments. Bankruptcy does not occur unless both of these conditions are 
met. Even if a business or family is unable to pay its bills in the current period, if its creditors do 
not come knocking on the door demanding to be paid, the debtor is not in bankruptcy. 
The federal government has options available to it that individuals and businesses do not 
have. If it was in danger of defaulting on a loan, government could either raise taxes or print the 
money it needed to payoff the lender. Again, we are treating the lender as an individual who 
purchases a treasury bill. Both remedies would have noticeable consequences in other areas of 
the economy, but because the government has these options, it is a no-risk borrower and, con-
sequently, practically any supplier in the market for loans is willing to lend to it. Because the 
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government has not yet been forced to increase its taxes substantially or monetize its debt, it 
would seem to run no risk of bankruptcy. We do not hear stories of the government unable to pay 
a bill or creditors running to government's door for fear of not getting paid. Thus, the idea of the 
government going bankrupt is unfounded. In fact, because the government is such a different 
entity from a family or a private business, it does not seem possible that bankruptcy could ever 
apply to the government. 
• The Burden on Future Generations 
Deficit spending occurring in the current fiscal year creates debt which must be paid off 
sometime in the future. The government uses borrowed dollars today to spend on public goods 
which inevitably must be paid for. This practice concerns many people, thinking that our current 
generation could be causing an unnecessary strain to future generations. 
What must be remembered is that public goods are rarely exclusive to one generation. A 
public good, such as a city park, may be designed and built during one fiscal year, but the current 
generation will not be the only group allowed to use it. When a park is built, it is intended to be 
used by the current generation and many future generations. Even though future generations 
may bear part of the cost of the park, they will most definitely derive enjoyment from the park. 
The park has a "spillover effect" because it will provide enjoyment and benefits to other groups of 
people besides the group that decided to build it. With the debt that carries over from year to 
year, the current generation which builds and uses the park and future generations which also 
use the park will share the cost of the public good. 
When future generations pay on this debt, they are not paying older generations -- they are 
paying the debt off to themselves. When a generation pays a debt, it in effect is paying itself. 
The idea that one generation somehow makes interest and principle payments to an older gen-
eration is unfounded. A transfer of funds simply takes place within generations. Suppose a 
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grandfather is receiving annual payments from the government on a 30-year treasury bond he 
owns, and 10 years into the 30-year bond he dies. Can he take the bond with him to the grave 
and continue to receive payments? This is certainly not possible. Instead, he leaves the bond to 
his daughter in his will, and she will begin receiving interest payments on the debt instrument. 
Being middle aged, the daughter's generation is presumably the generation paying the most 
taxes in the current period. Thus, we see the generation is paying the debt to themselves. Even 
if the grandfather had not died before the 30-year bond had matured, the return on his saving 
must be left to someone, and in this case he would leave it to a member of the generation which 
presumably paid the majority of taxes which funded that return on his saving. 
• The Three Levels of Crowding Out 
In a nutshell, the theory of crowding out says government deficits cause private consumption 
and investment to decrease from a tightening in the available supply of loanable funds. With the 
reasons mentioned earlier, the government is a sought-after borrower because it will never de-
fault on a loan. Supporters of the crowding out theory say that because the government puts 
extra demand on the loanable funds market, the equilibrium interest rate is artificially higher than 
it normally would be, thus "crowding out" potential private sector borrowers. 
A graph of the loanable funds market in Figure 4 illustrates the crowding out phenomenon. 
Assume the government is running a balanced budget. The loanable funds market is in equilib-
rium at point a, given the supply curve S and the initial demand curve D. If government now 
endorses expansionary fiscal policy and borrows in order to increase its spending, the demand 
curve will shift right by the amount government borrows (a" - a') to become D'. 
If the supply of loanable funds stays the same, the quantity of loans clearing the market will 
increase from a' to a*, but the interest rate will also undergo an increase as well-- from i1 to i2. 
When the government enters the loanable funds market as a buyer (demanding loans), total 
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FIGURE 4 
demand at the initial interest rate of i1 increases from a' to a". Because the supply schedule 
remains fixed, however, the interest rate will be bumped up to i2 and the quantity of loans clear-
ing the market will only increase to a*. The supply curve remains unchanged because we 
assume no one sees the increased demand for loanable funds. 
The government receives the entire amount of loans it wants (a" - a') because it is such a 
low-risk borrower. Because the equilibrium quantity of loans only increases to a*, however, an 
amount of a" - a* will be crowded out from the private sector to clear the path for additional 
government spending. 
The magnitude of crowding out which takes place depends largely on the elasticities3 of the 
supply and demand curves. In Figure 5, two supply curves are shown. 81 is relatively inelastic, 
3. Elasticity refers to the percentage change in quantity with respect to a given change in price, and it 
measures how responsive buyers and sellers are in a given market. Supply and demand curves that are 
more elastic are flatter (S2 on Figure 5) than curves which are less elastic (Sl). The flatter, more elastic 
curve illustrates a bigger change in quantity when the price (in this model the interest rate) increases or 
decreases. With the Sl supply schedule, suppliers of loanable funds are not very responsive to a change in 
the interest rate. Conversely, with the S2 supply schedule, suppliers are much more responsive to a given 
change in the interest rate. Curves which are perfectly elastic are horizontal, illustrating that there is only 
one interest rate at which suppliers will offer loanable funds. Curves which are perfectly inelastic are 
vertical, and they graphically show that suppliers will offer one fixed amount of loans regardless of the 
interest rate. Elasticity of demand operates in the same fashion. It represents how responsive buyers are 
to a change in price. 
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while 52 is relatively elastic. This illustration shows that, everything else remaining the same, 
more crowding out will occur the more inelastic the supply curve is. This follows, because a 
relatively inelastic supply curve (5,) requires a relatively larger increase in the interest rate to 
- entice suppliers to increase the quantity of loanable funds they will offer. Theoretically, 
government's entry into the market would cause perfect crowding out if the supply schedule was 
perfectly inelastic (a vertical supply curve). Perfect, or complete, crowding out results in a dol-
lar-for-dollar decrease in private spending with every borrowed dollar the government spends. 
Figure 6 presents two sets of demand curves, of which 0, is relatively inelastic and 02 is 
relatively elastic. No matter which set we start with, the analysis begins with government oper-
ating with a balanced budget at point a (circled). With the 0, system of demand curves, the new 
equilibrium quantity and the new equilibrium interest rate will be higher when the government 
enters the loanable funds market (illustrated by a shift from 0, to 0;) than with the 02 system of 
demand schedules. Analysis on the demand side of the market illustrates that the least crowd-
ing out will occur the more inelastic the demand curve is, all other factors unchanged. 
- Government's entry into the loanable funds market would cause no crowding out if the demand 
schedule was perfectly inelastic (a vertical demand curve). 
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If crowding out is proven to exist and that it has a dampening effect on private consumption 
and investment, then government's historical tendencies to spend into a deficit must be exam-
ined to see if its expansionary fiscal spending is as "productive" as the private investment that is 
crowded out. Prag (1992) writes that even though crowding out can occur when government 
runs deficits, the projects being undertaken by government, such as highway construction, NASA 
and national defense, have social merit and, in some cases, may be more beneficial than the 
private spending that was crowded out. Spector and Van Cott (1992) share a similar idea, 
thinking that some government expenditures increase the value and effectiveness of existing 
capital spending in the private sector. Their article is presented toward the end of this paper. 
• The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 
The theorem was aptly named Ricardo Equivalence Theorem because, other than being 
named after Ricardo's influence on the idea, its economic examples show that "budget deficits 
and taxation have equivalent effects on the economy" (Barro 1989). Proponents of the Ricardian 
Equivalence Theorem believe that households know their future taxes will increase because of 
deficit spending in the current period. Thus, current budget deficits become costs to the current 
generation in the current period only. Ricardian Equivalence also requires a degree of altruism 
13 
-- people want their children and grandchildren to be better off than they are. Thus they will 
leave behind more bequests to offset any current deficit spending that is taking place. There-
fore, when government undertakes expansionary fiscal policy to increase spending beyond its 
current receipts, Ricardian Equivalence is based on three premises: 1) deficit spending and 
increased taxation have equal effects on the economy, 2) people in the current period do not 
want to shift the burden of this current deficit on future generations and will take necessary 
action to make sure the burden is not shifted, and 3) the appropriate action taken is increasing 
private savings, which systematically increases the supply of loanable funds. 
Figure 7 details the Equivalence theme. The illustration is exactly like Figure 4, except that 
now the supply of loanable funds increases the same amount the demand schedule increased. 
People now recognize that the government is going to increase its spending and will need to 
borrow the funds to pay for that increase. The amount government wants to borrow is met by the 
- private sector, and as a result, no crowding out occurs. The interest rate remains at i1, ceteris 
paribus, but the quantity of loans clearing the market increases from Q l' to Ql". 
Increased savings by the private sector, of course, dampens its consumption of goods and 
services, but does supply the loanable funds market with extra funds which the government will 
i 
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-use in its deficit spending policy. It must be remembered that household savings are still classi-
fied as consumption in the classical aggregate model. Dollars flow out of consumption of goods 
and services and into saving, which the government borrows, resulting in no change in aggre-
gate consumption or aggregate demand. On top of this, of course, is increased government 
spending, which in the end results in an overall increase in aggregate demand. If the govern-
ment had chosen increasing taxes instead, this also would have decreased private consump-
tion, but no resulting increase in private saving would have occurred. The outflow from con-
sumption would have been channelled into government spending, and, unlike the above model, 
aggregate demand would experience no net change. 
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A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem says the private sector can foresee a budget deficit and 
will increase saving in order to minimize the costs to future generations. If this theory has merit, 
empirical studies would show that government deficits, which have been the norm in the U.S., 
have not led to substantial increases in the real interest rate. This has been a minority view in 
the economics profession, but a view that some economists, including Robert Barro, hold in high 
regard. 
"Overall, the empirical results on interest rates support the Ricardian 
view. Given these findings, it is remarkable that most 
macroeconomists remain confident that budget deficits raise interest 
rates." {1989}. 
Several empirical studies on the relationships between government deficits and the real in-
terest rate have been conducted, including Evans' (1985, 1987a and 1987b) conclusions that no 
significant correlation exists between budget deficits and higher interest rates. In his two works 
in 1987, Evans even cites Ricardian Equivalence as a possible explanation for the fact that 
statistical evidence cannot be formulated to show a positive relationship between deficits and an 
increase in interest rates. Evans also goes outside the U.S. in one of his works and analyzed 
deficit and interest rate data in five other industrial countries besides the U.S.: Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
Hoelscher (1983) finds "no significant relationship between Federal borrowing and short 
term interest rates forthe post-WWII period." From that premise, he also concludes that federal 
borrowing has very little crowding out effect when private expenditures are largely sensitive to 
short term rates only. 
Arestis (1979) conducted an empirical study of crowding out effects in the U.K. His work did 
not focus solely on government deficits and interest rates, but looked at overall spending in the 
public and private sectors to see if statistical evidence existed for the crowding out argument. 
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-He found that, with the exception of tax-financed government spending, crowding out did not 
occur. Thus, the models showed that increasing the money supply and undertaking deficit fi-
nance through issuing bonds did not crowd out an equivalent amount of private spending. 
Cebula offers two studies which contrast with these articles. In his first article (1985), he 
defines investment as business purchases of new plant and equipment and correlates the ratio 
of investment to gross national product with the ratio of deficits to GNP over the time period from 
1970 through 1982. Cebula finds statistical evidence supporting a crowding out effect which 
limits investment because of defict spending by the government. Because of the crowding out 
effects he finds, Cebula summarizes one short term and two long term consequences. Fiscal 
policy is rendered less powerful in the short run, while in the long run, diminished private invest-
ment causes slower economic growth and less capital formation. 
In his second article, Cebula (1987b) shifts his focus from an investment ratio to the real 
interest rate. He formulates a model that statistically proves an increasing real defict to real 
GNP ratio exerts upward pressure on the real interest rate. Cebula used a real interest rate to 
account for business cycle effects, which will increase the nominal interest rate during economic 
expansion and decrease it during recessionary swings. In both articles, he used a deficit to GNP 
ratio rather than deficit amounts themselves, which resembles the discussion in section 4 of this 
paper. A government deficit is much more meaningful when it is expressed in real dollars rela-
tive to a country's income. 
As this review of literature shows, certain economists have found no statistical evidence to 
support the existence of crowding out, while others have found such evidence. As the next 
section describes, however, statistical methodology is secondary if a model does not take into 
account all relative economic principles. 
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AN ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINT 
Spector and Van Cott (1988) analyzed the issue of crowding out from a different perspective. 
The authors are critical of empirical work which tries to connect government deficits with subse-
quent increases in interest rates. Certain situations exist where a government deficit will in-
crease the interest rate but cause no crowding out. Another unique scenario occurs when a 
government deficit causes perfect crowding out, but does not affect the interest rate. Given 
these situations, Spector and Van Cott conclude that empirical data correlating government 
deficits and increases in the interest rate are incomplete in determining whether or not deficits 
lead to crowding out. 
Closer attention should be given to the elasticities of the supply and demand of loanable 
funds. Assume we have a traditional demand curve, as shown in Figures 8 and 9. No crowding 
out will occur with a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds, denoted by the horizontal supply 
curve in Figure 8. The horizontal supply curve is perfectly elastic because it shows that lenders 
will offer an unlimited supply of loans at only one interest rate. Any slight change in the interest 
rate has a large effect on the amount of funds lenders are willing to supply" 
i 
FIGURE 8 -- PERFECILY ELASTIC SUPPLY 
ZERO CROWDING OUT 
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A vertical supply curve is perfectly inelastic, or completely unresponsive to price changes. In 
this situation, lenders will offer a fixed amount of loans at any interest rate, evidenced by the fact 
that any change in the interest rate has no effect on the amount of funds lenders will potentially 
- supply (Figure 9). If the government borrows to finance more spending, the interest rate is 
pushed up but the supply of loans remains constant. Perfect crowding out occurs because the 
supply of loans is fixed. 
Perfectly elastic and perfectly inelastic supply curves are extremes, but they represent the 
two ends of the crowding out spectrum. Using these opposite cases, we can quickly determine 
the degree of crowding out that will take place. Everything else remaining the same, with a 
highly elastic supply of loans (typical of a flat supply curve), little crowding out will occur. Con-
versely, with little elasticity of supply, the private sector faces a higher degree of crowding out. 
Previous empirical articles highlighted earlier in this paper which hold that a correlation ex-
ists between higher interest rates and crowding out compare favorably with the two models 
presented above. Spector and Van Cott also inquire about the demand side of the loanable 
- funds market, however. The following two models (Figures 10 and 11) will analyze a traditional 
supply curve with perfectly elastic and perfectly inelastic demand curves. It is here where the 
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FIGURE 10 -- PERFEcTLy INFLASnC DEMAND 
ZERo CROWDING OUT 
shortcomings of the empirical studies, which attempt to draw a correlation between increased 
interest rates and the occurrence of crowding out are revealed. 
If demand is perfectly inelastic, it is totally unresponsive to price changes, or changes in the 
interest rate. When the government enters the loanable funds market (Figure 10), the demand 
curve shifts to the right from D to D'. The equilibrium interest rate increases from i1 to i2, the 
equilibrium quantity of loans increases from a' to a", but no crowding out occurs. 
A perfectly elastic demand schedule is given in Figure 11, illustrating that the demand for 
loans is infinite at one particular interest rate (i1) and zero at all other interest rates. In this 
model, when the government enters the loanable funds market, perfect crowding out occurs. 
The demand schedule does not shift, even though more potential borrowers are entering the 
market. Unless the supply curve would shift to S', the quantity of loans is fixed at a' and the 
interest rate remains unchanged at i1. Thus, we see a model where no change in the interest 
rate is associated with perfect crowding out -- an amount of a" -a'. 
Using this additional analysis, it appears that certain empirical studies linking government 
- deficits with an increase in interest rates is incomplete. Cebula (1987a) concludes he has found 
a transmission mechanism through which crowding out hits the economy, but Spector and Van 
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FIGURE 11 -- PERFEclLY ELASTIC DEMAND 
PERmcT CROWDING OUT 
Cott would argue that mechanism is incomplete based on the loanable funds models with per-
fectly elastic or perfectly inelastic demand. 
In a second article, Spector and Van Cott (1992) assume the deficit spending the government 
- is undertaking is having a positive effect on the economy. Specifically, they propose "a deficit 
(which) traces to spending initiatives that enhance the security and/or productivity of private 
property." They note that many of the empirical studies which test for a correlation between 
increased deficit spending and decreased private investment are not taking into account this 
deficit coefficient, which represents "allocative consequences of the government's marginal spend-
ing initiatives." Thus, this deficit coefficient recognizes the benefits of deficit spending. 
The authors are not defending deficit spending with this analysis. However, they do point 
out, with the help of macroeconomic formulas, that an increase in the real interest rate brought 
about by a change in marginal deficit spending is positively related to the deficit coefficient. In 
other words, an increase in the efficiency of additional deficit spending can cause independent 
upward pressure on the interest rate. Spector and Van Cott came to a similar conclusion with 
private investment -- a positive deficit coefficient can spark increased investment because of the 
productivity of the additional government spending. Many of the economists conducting statisti-
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-cal surveys which either build or refute a link between deficit spending and crowding out are 
ignoring this deficit coefficient, but Spector and Van Cott hold that the increased security or 
productivity of private property as a result of additional spending by the government might be the 
very reasons the real interest rate is rising. In addition, their models show that with a positive 
deficit coefficient, the real interest rate and private investment can increase simultaneously. 
While other studies are simply formulating a statistical link among marginal deficit spending, 
interest rates and investment, Spector and Van Cott provide evidence that empirical studies 
which ignore certain variables, such as the deficit coefficient or elasticity of demand, do not tell 
the whole story. 
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CONCLUSION 
Deficits and debt have received a considerable amount of negative press and publicity for 
many years. Despite the negative sentiment, however, the government continues to spend above 
its receipts. The information presented in this paper gives evidence both supporting the practice 
of deficit spending and evidence against it, but the central theme is that deficits can be mea-
sured and assessed in many ways. Some ways are correct, but many are wrong. A critic who 
only looks at the differences between annual deficit amounts in nominal terms is not going to be 
in favor of deficit spending. However, that critic would also be incorrect to jump to such a conclu-
sion on the limited and rather meaningless data he or she is using. Because a myriad of vari-
ables are related to deficit finance, arriving at a simple conclusion of "deficits are good," or 
"deficits are bad" is difficult and unwise with limited information. 
Economists have formulated the crowding out model as a consequence of deficits, and it will 
continue to be used in the deficit spending debate. However, there is no single method for 
applying the crowding out model. A deficit scenario which suffers from crowding out, according 
to one economist, might be deemed to have zero crowding by another. And, as the Spector and 
Van Cott articles discussed, a crowding out model can be wrongly applied to a deficit situation if 
only some of the key variables are used in the analysis. A model may appear to experience 
crowding out at first glance, but this same model could be argued to have no crowding out effects 
by another economist using a different system of variables. 
Progress in the deficit spending debate can only continue with increased research and study 
of the true effects -- the real benefits and costs -- of government deficits. This paper presents 
different sides of this debate but makes few conclusions about which methods of analyzing 
government deficits and the potential crowding out effects that might follow are best. With con-
tinued research on this topic, it is hoped that more agreement on deficit spending will be reached, 
which in turn will leave less room for speculation. 
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Appendix A - Annual Receipts, Outlays and Deficit or Surplus, 1940-1995 
Total Total Deficit or GOP Real Real Real Deficit 
--
Receipts Outlays (Surplus) Deflator Receipts Outlays or (Surplus) 
YuJ: lMilljons) (Millions) (Milljons) (Base: 1987) (Millions) (Millions) (Mjlljons) 
1940 ............ $6,548 ................ $9,468 ................ $2,920 ................ 0.1147 ............... $57,088 .............. $82,546 .............. $25,458 
1941 ............ $8,712 ............... $13,653 ............... $4,941 ................ 0.1195 ............... $72,904 ............. $114,251 ............. $41,347 
1942 ........... $14,634 .............. $35,137 .............. $20,503 ............... 0.1263 .............. $115,867 ............ $278,203 ............ $162,336 
1943 ........... $24,001 .............. $78,555 .............. $54,554 ............... 0.1304 .............. $184,057 ............ $602,416 ............ $418,359 
1944 ........... $43,747 .............. $91,304 .............. $47,557 ............... 0.1319 .............. $331,668 ............. $692,221 ............ $360,553 
1945 ........... $45,159 .............. $92,712 .............. $47,553 ............... 0.1360 .............. $332,051 ............. $681,706 ............ $349,654 
1946 ........... $39,296 .............. $55,232 .............. $15,936 ............... 0.1552 .............. $253,196 ............. $355,876 ............ $102,680 
1947 ........... $38,514 .............. $34,496 .............. ($4,018) ............... 0.1855 .............. $207,623 ............. $185,962 ........... ($21,660) 
1948 ........... $41,560 .............. $29,764 ............. ($11,796) .............. 0.1954 .............. $212,692 ............. $152,323 ........... ($60,368) 
1949 ........... $39,415 .............. $38,835 ............... ($580) ................ 0.2028 .............. $194,354 ............. $191,494 ............. ($2,860) 
1950 ........... $39,443 .............. $42,562 ............... $3,119 ................ 0.2002 .............. $197,018 ............ $212,597 ............. $15,579 
1951 ........... $51,616 .............. $45,514 .............. ($6,102) ............... 0.2110 .............. $244,626 ............. $215,706 ........... ($28,919) 
1952 ........... $66,167 .............. $67,686 ............... $1,519 ................ 0.2147 .............. $308,184 ............. $315,259 .............. $7,075 
1953 ........... $69,608 .............. $76,101 ............... $6,493 ................ 0.2199 .............. $316,544 ............. $346,071 ............. $29,527 
1954 ........... $69,701 .............. $70,855 ............... $1,154 ................ 0.2222 .............. $313,686 ............. $318,879 .............. $5,194 
1955 ........... $65,451 .............. $68,444 ............... $2,993 ................ 0.2263 .............. $289,222 ............. $302,448 ............. $13,226 
1956 ........... $74,587 .............. $70,640 .............. ($3,947) ............... 0.2345 .............. $318,068 ............. $301,237 ........... ($16,832) 
1957 ........... $79,990 .............. $76,578 .............. ($3,412) ............... 0.2425 .............. $329,856 ............ $315,786 ........... ($14,070) 
1958 ........... $79,636 .............. $82,405 ............... $2,769 ................ 0.2481 .............. $320,983 ............ $332,144 ............. $11,161 
1959 ........... $79,249 .............. $92,098 .............. $12,849 ............... 0.2548 .............. $311 ,024 ............ $361,452 ............. $50,428 
1960 ........... $92,492 .............. $92,191 ............... ($301) ................ 0.2609 .............. $354,511 ............ $353,358 ............. ($1,154) 
1961 ........... $94,388 .............. $97,723 ............... $3,335 ................ 0.2633 .............. $358,481 ............ $371,147 ............. $12,666 
1962 ........... $99,676 ............. $106,821 .............. $7,145 ................ 0.2680 .............. $371 ,925 ............ $398,586 ............. $26,660 
1963 .......... $106,560 ............ $111,316 .............. $4,756 ................ 0.2727 .............. $390,759 ............ $408,199 ............. $17,440 
1964 .......... $112,613 ............ $118,528 .............. $5,915 ................ 0.2767 .............. $406,986 ............ $428,363 ............. $21,377 
-
1965 .......... $116,817 ............ $118,228 .............. $1,411 ................ 0.2828 .............. $413,073 ............ $418,062 .............. $4,989 
1966 .......... $130,835 ............ $134,532 .............. $3,697 ................ 0.2913 .............. $449, 142 ............ $461,833 ............. $12,691 
1967 .......... $148,822 ............ $157,464 .............. $8,642 ................ 0.3013 .............. $493,933 ............ $522,615 ............. $28,682 
1968 .......... $152,973 ............ $178,134 ............. $25,161 ............... 0.3126 .............. $489,357 ............ $569,846 ............. $80,489 
1969 .......... $186,882 ............ $183,640 ............. ($3,242) ............... 0.3283 .............. $569,242 ............ $559,366 ............. ($9,875) 
1970 .......... $192,807 ............ $195,649 .............. $2,842 ................ 0.3461 .............. $557,085 ............ $565,296 .............. $8,211 
1971 .......... $187,139 ............ $210,172 ............. $23,033 ............... 0.3641 .............. $513,977 ............ $577,237 ............. $63,260 
1972 .......... $207,309 ............ $230,681 ............. $23,372 ............... 0.3831 .............. $541,135 ............ $602,143 ............. $61,008 
1973 .......... $230,799 ............ $245,707 ............. $14,908 ............... 0.4021 .............. $573,984 ............ $611,059 ............. $37,075 
1974 .......... $263,224 ............ $269,359 .............. $6,135 ................ 0.4328 .............. $608, 189 ............ $622,364 ............. $14,175 
1975 .......... $279,090 ............ $332,332 ............. $53,242 ............... 0.4758 .............. $586,570 ............ $698,470 ............ $111,900 
1976 .......... $298,060 ............ $371,792 ............. $73,732 ............... 0.5124 .............. $581,694 ............ $725,589 ............ $143,895 
TO .............. $81,232 .............. $95,975 .............. $14,743 ............... 0.5308 .............. $153,037 ............ $180,812 ............. $27,775 
1977 .......... $355,559 ............ $409,218 ............. $53,659 ............... 0.5538 .............. $642,035 ............ $738,927 ............. $96,892 
1978 .......... $399,561 ............ $458,746 ............. $59,185 ............... 0.5957 .............. $670,742 ............ $770,096 ............. $99,354 
1979 .......... $463,302 ............ $504,032 ............. $40,730 ............... 0.6474 .............. $715,635 ............ $778,548 ............. $62,913 
1980 .......... $517,112 ............ $590,947 ............. $73,835 ............... 0.7058 .............. $732,661 ............ $837,273 ............ $104,612 
1981 .......... $599,272 ............ $678,249 ............. $78,977 ............... 0.7776 .............. $770,669 ............ $872,234 ............ $101,565 
1982 .......... $617,766 ............ $745,755 ............ $127,989 .............. 0.8355 .............. $739,397 ............ $892,585 ............ $153,189 
1983 .......... $600,562 ............ $808,380 ............ $207,818 .............. 0.8702 .............. $690, 142 ............ $928,959 ............ $238,816 
1984 .......... $666,457 ............ $851,846 ............ $185,389 .............. 0.9085 .............. $733,580 ............ $937,640 ............ $204,061 
1985 .......... $734,057 ............ $946,391 ............ $212,334 .............. 0.9432 .............. $778,262 ........... $1 ,003,383 .......... $225,121 
1986 .......... $769,091 ............ $990,336 ............ $221,245 .............. 0.9712 .............. $791 ,898 ........... $1 ,019,703 .......... $227,806 
1987 .......... $854,143 ........... $1 ,003,911 ........... $149,768 .............. 1.0000 .............. $854, 143 ........... $1,003,911 .......... $149,768 
1988 .......... $908,954 ........... $1,064,140 .......... $155,186 .............. 1.0363 .............. $877,115 ........... $1,026,865 .......... $149,750 
1989 .......... $990,691 ........... $1,143,172 .......... $152,481 .............. 1.0830 .............. $914,765 ........... $1,055,560 .......... $140,795 
1990 ......... $1 ,031 ,321 ......... $1 ,252,705 .......... $221,384 .............. 1.1295 .............. $913,077 ........... $1,109,079 .......... $196,002 
- 1991 ......... $1 ,054,272 ......... $1 ,323,441 .......... $269,169 .............. 1.1764 .............. $896, 185 ........... $1,124,992 .......... $228,807 
1992 ......... $1,090,453 ......... $1,380,856 .......... $290,403 .............. 1.2112 .............. $900,308 ........... $1,140,073 .......... $239,765 
1993 ......... $1,153,535 ......... $1,408,675 .......... $255,140 .............. 1.2400 .............. $930,270 ........... $1,136,028 .......... $205,758 
1994 ......... $1 ,257,745 ......... $1 ,460,914 .......... $203,169 .............. 1.2643 .............. $994,815 ........... $1,155,512 .......... $160,697 
1995 ......... $1,346,414 ......... $1,538,920 .......... $192,506 .............. 1.2984 ............ $1,036,979 ......... $1,185,243 .......... $148,264 
Appendix B - Per-Capita Deficit and Per-Capita Debt, 1962-1994 
Increase 
Real Deficit End-of-Year Per-Capita Multiple End-of-Year from Multiple Annual Multiple of 
-
or (Surplus) Population Defictor of 1962 Debt Previous of 1940 Per-capita 1940 
YiIit[ (Milljons) (Millions) (Sumlus) Per-Cao. (1987 Dollars) k RaaJ Debt Real Debt Per-caoita 
1962 ............ $26.660 .......... 186.538 ........ $143 ......... 1.00 ..... $1.130.328 .......... 1.70% ............. 2.56 ......... $6.060 ......... 1.00 
1963 ............ $17.440 .......... 189.242 .......... $92 ......... 0.64 ..... $1,137.968 .......... 0.68% ............. 2.57 ......... $6.013 ......... 0.99 
1964 ............ $21.377 .......... 191.889 ......... $111 ......... 0.78 ..... $1,142.244 .......... 0.38% ............. 2.58 ......... $5.953 ......... 0.98 
1965 .............. $4.989 .......... 194.303 .......... $26 ......... 0.18 ..... $1.139,738 ........ -0.22% ............. 2.58 ......... $5.866 ......... 0.97 
1966 ............ $12.691 ............ 196.56 .......... $65 ......... 0.45 ..... $1,127,697 ........ -1.06% ............. 2.55 ......... $5.737 ......... 0.95 
1967 ............ $28.682 .......... 198.712 ........ $144 ......... 1.01 ..... $1.129,920 .......... 0.20% ............. 2.56 ......... $5.686 ......... 0.94 
1968 ............ $80,489 .......... 200.706 ........ $401 ......... 2.81 ..... $1.179,415 .......... 4.38% ............. 2.67 ......... $5.876 ......... 0.97 
1969 ........... ($9.875) .......... 202.677 ........ ($49) ........ -0.34 ..... $1.114,130 ........ -5.54% ............. 2.52 ......... $5,497 ......... 0.91 
1970 .............. $8,211 .......... 205.052 .......... $40 ......... 0.28 ..... $1.100,610 ........ -1.21 % ............. 2.49 ......... $5.367 ......... 0.89 
1971 ............ $63,260 .......... 207.661 ........ $305 ......... 2.13 ..... $1.121.055 .......... 1.86% ............. 2.54 ......... $5.398 ......... 0.89 
1972 ............ $61.008 .......... 209.896 ........ $291 ......... 2.03 ..... $1.137.917 .......... 1.50% ............. 2.57 ......... $5,421 ......... 0.89 
1973 ............ $37.075 .......... 211.909 ........ $175 ......... 1.22 ..... $1.159.639 .......... 1.91% ............. 2.62 ......... $5,472 ......... 0.90 
1974 ............ $14.175 .......... 213.854 .......... $66 ......... 0.46 ..... $1.118.052 ........ -3.59% ............. 2.53 ......... $5,228 ......... 0.86 
1975 .......... $111.900 .......... 215.973 ........ $518 ......... 3.63 ..... $1.138.976 .......... 1.87% ............. 2.58 ......... $5,274 ......... 0.87 
1976 .......... $143.895 .......... 218.035 ........ $660 ......... 4.62 ..... $1,227.498 .......... 7.77% ............. 2.78 ......... $5,630 ......... 0.93 
TO ............... $27.775 .................................... - ........... -- ..... $1.212.436 ........ -1.23% ............. 2.74 ............... - ............ --
1977 ............ $96.892 .......... 220.904 ........ $439 ......... 3.07 ..... $1.275.547 .......... 5.21% ............. 2.89 ......... $5.774 ......... 0.95 
1978 ............ $99.354 .......... 223.278 ........ $445 ......... 3.11 ..... $1.303.680 .......... 2.21 % ............. 2.95 ......... $5.839 ......... 0.96 
1979 ............ $62.913 .......... 225.779 ........ $279 ......... 1.95 ..... $1.281.233 ........ -1.72% ............. 2.90 ......... $5,675 ......... 0.94 
1980 .......... $104.612 .......... 228.468 ........ $458 ......... 3.20 ..... $1.287.971 .......... 0.53% ............. 2.91 ......... $5.637 ......... 0.93 
1981 .......... $101.565 .......... 230.848 ........ $440 ......... 3.08 ..... $1.279.379 ........ -0.67% ............. 2.89 ......... $5.542 ......... 0.91 
1982 .......... $153.189 .......... 233.184 ........ $657 ......... 4.60 ..... $1.361.275 .......... 6.40% ............. 3.08 ......... $5,838 ......... 0.96 
1983 .......... $238.816 .......... 235.439 ..... $1.014 ......... 7.10 ..... $1.576.316 ........ 15.80% ............. 3.57 ......... $6.695 ......... 1.10 
1984 .......... $204.061 .......... 237.663 ........ $859 ......... 6.01 ..... $1.722.242 .......... 9.26% ............. 3.90 ......... $7,247 ......... 1.20 
1985 .......... $225.121 .......... 239.134 ........ $941 ......... 6.59 ..... $1.926.973 ........ 11.89% ............. 4.36 ......... $8.058 ......... 1.33 
- 1986 .......... $227.806 .......... 241.304 ........ $944 ......... 6.61 ..... $2.183.514 ........ 13.31% ............. 4.94 ......... $9,049 ......... 1.49 
1987 .......... $149.768 .......... 243.479 ........ $615 ......... 4.30 ..... $2.346,125 .......... 7.45% ............. 5.31 ......... $9.636 ......... 1.59 
1988 .......... $149.750 ............ 245.73 ........ $609 ......... 4.26 ..... $2,510.187 .......... 6.99% ............. 5.68 ....... $10.215 ......... 1.69 
1989 .......... $140.795 .......... 248.061 ........ $568 ......... 3.97 ..... $2,648.235 .......... 5.50% ............. 5.99 ....... $10.676 ......... 1.76 
1990 .......... $196.002 .......... 250.689 ........ $782 ......... 5.47 ..... $2,838.923 .......... 7.20% ............. 6.42 ....... $11.324 ......... 1.87 
1991 .......... $228.807 .......... 253.426 ........ $903 ......... 6.32 ..... $3,058.907 .......... 7.75% ............. 6.92 ....... $12.070 ......... 1.99 
1992 .......... $239.765 .......... 256.271 ........ $936 ......... 6.55 ..... $3,304.273 .......... 8.02% ............. 7.48 ....... $12.894 ......... 2.13 
1993 .......... $205.758 .......... 257.908 ........ $798 ......... 5.58 ..... $3,509.206 .......... 6.20% ............. 7.94 ....... $13.606 ......... 2.25 
1994 .......... $160.697 .......... 260.662 ........ $616 ......... 4.31 ..... $3,672.950 .......... 4.67% ............. 8.31 ....... $14.091 ......... 2.33 
Appendix C - Real Deficit and Debt as Percentages of Real GOp, 1940-1995 
Percentage Real Real Percentage 
-
Real Increase Real Deficit Deficit End-of-Year Increase Real Debt 
GOP From Prevo or (Surplus) Pet. of Debt From Prevo Pet. of 
Yur (Billions) Yur (Millions) Real GOP (Millions) Yu!: Real GDP 
1940 .......... $831.7 ............... --.............. $25,458 ................. 3.06% ............ $441,988 .................. -- .............. 53.140/0 
1941 .......... $941.4 ........... 13.19% .............. $41,347 ................. 4.39% ............ $481,431 ................. 8.92% .............. 51.14% 
1942 ....... $1,122.7 ........... 19.26% ............ $162,336 ............... 14.46% ............ $627,078 ............... 30.25% .............. 55.85% 
1943 ....... $1,345.1 ........... 19.81% ............ $418,359 ............... 31.10% ......... $1,093,926 ............... 74.45% .............. 81.33% 
1944 ....... $1,529.2 ........... 13.69% ............ $360,553 ............... 23.58% ......... $1,547,225 ............... 41.44% ............ 101.18% 
1945 ....... $1,558.8 ............. 1.94% ............ $349,654 ............... 22.43% ......... $1,912,669 ............... 23.62% ............ 122.70% 
1946 ....... $1,369.2 .......... -12.16% ............ $102,680 ................. 7.50% ......... $1,746,076 ............... -8.71% ............ 127.53% 
1947 ....... $1,201.6 .......... -12.24% ............ ($21,660) ................... --......... $1,386,248 ............. -20.61% ............. 115.37% 
1948 ....... $1,262.5 ............. 5.07% ............ ($60,368) ................... --......... $1 ,289,821 ............... -6.96% ............ 102.16% 
1949 ....... $1,295.4 ............. 2.61 % .............. ($2,860) ................... --......... $1,245,611 ............... -3.43% .............. 96.16% 
1950 ....... $1,327.7 ............. 2.49% .............. $15,579 ................. 1.17% ......... $1,282,982 ................. 3.00% .............. 96.63% 
1951 ....... $1,485.8 ............ 11.91% ............ ($28,919) ................... -- ......... $1,209,896 ............... -5.70% .............. 81.43% 
1952 ....... $1,585.9 ............. 6.74% ................ $7,075 ................. 0.45% ......... $1 ,206,786 ............... ··0.26% .............. 76.09% 
1953 ....... $1,654.4 ............. 4.32% .............. $29,527 ................. 1.78% ......... $1,209,472 ................. 0.22% ............... 73.11 % 
1954 ....... $1,656.2 .............. 0.110/0 ................ $5,194 ................. 0.31% ......... $1,218,n6 ................. 0.77% .............. 73.59% 
1955 ....... $1,700.0 ............. 2.64% .............. $13,226 ................. 0.78% ......... $1,212,399 ............... ··0.52% .............. 71.32% 
1956 ....... $1,n5.3 ............. 4.43% ............ ($16,832) ................... -- ......... $1,162,870 ............... -4.09% .............. 65.50% 
1957 ....... $1,807.4 ............. 1.81% ............ ($14,070) ................... -- ......... $1,122,689 ............... -3.46% .............. 62.12% 
1958 ....... $1,806.1 ............ -0.07% ............... $11,161 ................. 0.62% ......... $1,127,231 ................. 0.40% .............. 62.41% 
1959 ....... $1,884.6 ............. 4.35% .............. $50,428 ................. 2.68% ......... $1 ,128,199 ................. 0.09% .............. 59.86% 
1960 ....... $1,934.1 ............. 2.63% .............. ($1,154) ................... -- ......... $1,113,549 ............... -1.30% .............. 57.57% 
1961 ....... $1,963.5 ............. 1.52% .............. $12,666 ................. 0.65% ......... $1,111,462 ............... -0.19% .............. 56.61% 
1962 ....... $2,071.6 ............. 5.51% .............. $26,660 ................. 1.29% ......... $1,130,328 ................. 1.70% .............. 54.56% 
1963 ....... $2,143.4 ............. 3.47% .............. $17,440 ................. 0.81% ......... $1,137,968 ................. 0.68% .............. 53.09% 
-
1964 ....... $2,259.8 ............. 5.43% .............. $21,377 ................. 0.95% ......... $1 ,142,244 ................. 0.38% .............. 50.55% 
1965 ....... $2,372.7 ............. 5.00% ................ $4,989 ................. 0.21% ......... $1,139,738 ............... -0.22% .............. 48.04% 
1966 ....... $2,524.5 ............. 6.40% .............. $12,691 ................. 0.50% ......... $1,127,697 ............... ·1.06% .............. 44.67% 
1967 ....... $2,632.9 ............. 4.29% .............. $28,682 ................. 1.09% ......... $1,129,920 ................. 0.20% .............. 42.92% 
1968 ....... $2,710.2 ............. 2.94% .............. $80,489 ................. 2.97% ......... $1,179,415 ................ .4.38% .............. 43.52% 
1969 ....... $2,819.7 ............. 4.04% .............. ($9,875) ................... -- ......... $1,114,130 ............... -5.54% .............. 39.51% 
1970 ....... $2,847.2 ............. 0.98% ................. $8,211 ................. 0.29% ......... $1,100,610 ............... -1.21% .............. 38.66% 
1971 ....... $2,886.3 ............. 1.37% .............. $63,260 ................. 2.19% ......... $1,121,055 ................. 1.86% .............. 38.84% 
1972 ....... $2,996.1 ............. 3.80% .............. $61,008 ................. 2.04% ......... $1,137,917 ................. 1.50% .............. 37.98% 
1973 ....... $3,168.4 ............. 5.75% .............. $37,075 ................. 1.17% ......... $1,159,639 ................. 1.91% .............. 36.60% 
1974 ....... $3,243.1 ............. 2.36% .............. $14,175 ................. 0.44% ......... $1,118,052 ............... -3.59% .............. 34.47% 
1975 ....... $3,173.2 ............ -2.16% ............. $111,900 ................. 3.53% ......... $1,138,976 ................. 1.87% .............. 35.89% 
1976 ....... $3,286.9 ............. 3.58% ............ $143,895 ................. 4.38% ......... $1,227,498 ................. 7.77% .............. 37.35% 
19n ....... $3,461.9 ............. 5.32% .............. $96,892 ................. 2.80% ......... $1,275,547 ................. 3.91% .............. 36.85% 
1978 ....... $3,617.6 ............. 4.50% .............. $99,354 ................. 2.68% ......... $1,303,680 ................. 2.21% .............. 36.04% 
1979 ....... $3,752.7 ............. 3.73% .............. $62,913 ................. 2.65% ......... $1 ,281,233 ............... -1.72% .............. 34.14% 
1980 ....... $3,746.2 ............ -0.17% ............ $104,612 ................. 1.68% ......... $1,287,971 ................. 0.53% .............. 34.38% 
1981 ....... $3,812.2 ............. 1.76% ............ $101,565 ................. 2.74% ......... $1,279,379 ............... -0.67% .............. 33.56% 
1982 ....... $3,736.9 ............ -1.98% ............ $153,189 ................. 2.72% ......... $1,361,275 ................. 6.40% .............. 36.43% 
1983 ........ $3,811.2 ............. 1.99% ............ $238,816 ................. 4.02% ......... $1,576,316 ............... 15.80% .............. 41.36% 
1984 ....... $4,067.1 ............. 6.71% ............ $204,061 ................. 5.87% ......... $1,722,242 ................. 9.26% .............. 42.35% 
1985 ....... $4,206.6 ............. 3.43% ............ $225,121 ................. 4.85% ......... $1 ,926,973 ............... 11.89% .............. 45.81% 
1986 ....... $4,344.1 ............. 3.27% ............ $227,806 ................. 5.18% ......... $2,183,514 ............... 13.31% .............. 50.26% 
1987 ....... $4,452.4 ............. 2.49% ............ $149,768 ................. 5.12% ......... $2,346,125 ................. 7.45% .............. 52.69% 
1988 ....... $4,640.0 ............. 4.21% ............ $149,750 ................. 3.23% ......... $2,510,187 ................. 6.99% .............. 54.10% 
1989 ....... $4,776.8 ............. 2.95% ............ $140,795 ................. 3.13% ......... $2,648,235 ................. 5.50% .............. 55.44% 
-
1990 ....... $4,853.0 ............. 1.60% ............ $196,002 ................. 2.90% ......... $2,838,923 ................. 7.20% .............. 58.50% 
1991 ....... $4,825.2 ............ -0.57% ............ $228,807 ................. 4.06% ......... $3,058,907 ................. 7.75% .............. 63.39% 
1992 ....... $4,889.0 ............. 1.32% ............ $239,765 ................. 4.68% ......... $3,304,273 ................. 8.02% .............. 67.59% 
1993 ....... $5,047.3 ............. 3.24% ............ $205,758 ................. 4.75% ......... $3,509,206 ................. 6.20% .............. 69.53% 
1994 ....... $5,246.9 ............. 3.95% ............ $160,697 ................. 3.92% ......... $3,672,950 ................. 4.67% .............. 70.00% 
1995 ....... $5,409.8 ............. 3.10% ............ $148,264 ................. 2.97% ......... $3,821,264 ................. 4.04% .............. 70.64% 
--
Appendix D - Annual GDP Deflator 
Indexes, 1940-1995 (Base Year: 1987) 
1940 ......... 0.1147 1959 ......... 0.2548 1977 ......... 0.5538 
1941 ......... 0.1195 1960 ......... 0.2609 1978 ......... 0.5957 
1942 ......... 0.1263 1961 ......... 0.2633 1979 ......... 0.6474 
1943 ......... 0.1304 1962 ......... 0.2680 1980 ......... 0.7058 
1944 ......... 0.1319 1963 ......... 0.2727 1981 ......... 0.m6 
1945 ......... 0.1360 1964 ......... 0.2767 1982 ......... 0.8355 
1946 ......... 0.1552 1965 ......... 0.2828 1983 ......... 0.8702 
1947 ......... 0.1855 1966 ......... 0.2913 1984 ......... 0.9085 
1948 ......... 0.1954 1967 ......... 0.3013 1985 ......... 0.9432 
1949 ......... 0.2028 1968 ......... 0.3126 1986 ......... 0.9712 
1950 ......... 0.2002 1969 ......... 0.3283 1987 ••••••••• 1.0000 
1951 ......... 0.2110 1970 ......... 0.3461 1988 ......... 1.0363 
1952 ......... 0.2147 1971 ......... 0.3641 1989 ......... 1.0830 
1953 ......... 0.2199 1972 ......... 0.3831 1990 ......... 1.1295 
1954 ......... 0.2222 1973 ......... 0.4021 1991 ......... 1.1764 
1955 ......... 0.2263 1974 ......... 0.4328 1992 ......... 1.2112 
1956 ......... 0.2345 1975 ......... 0.4758 1993 ......... 1.2400 
1957 ......... 0.2425 1976 ......... 0.5124 1994 ......... 1.2643 
1958 ......... 0.2481 TO ......... 0.5308 1995 ......... 1.2984 
